Politico
By David Rogers
August 19, 2014
The
White House fax arrived at the Senate on July 22 with no letterhead
attached and an almost Onion-like heading: “Deliberative Pre-decisional
Technical Assistance.”
Days
before, on July 17, Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson had met
with Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) to discuss changes in law sought
by President Barack Obama
to speed the deportation of unaccompanied child migrants who had been
crossing the Rio Grande from Central America in record numbers.
The
three and a half pages of draft legislation — faxed to Feinstein’s
office — represented the work of attorneys at the White House and
Homeland Security trying to answer
her demands that the administration be more specific.
A month later, that single fax still stands out as the closest Obama ever got to spelling out his legislative proposal.
Even
then, as the obscure title suggests, there were no public commitments,
no presidential fingerprints. And the White House still refuses requests
from POLITICO to see
the draft, the outlines of which were described by several people
familiar with the document.
Looking
back, it’s a remarkable picture of how Washington works — and doesn’t. A
failure all the more striking in a crisis so very American in nature
and all about children.
Obama,
trained at Harvard Law and surrounded by attorneys, never spelled out
the changes in law he wanted — changes that would directly affect child
migrants, who most
often have no attorneys of their own.
All
this from a White House so eager to make the statutory changes that it
gave an advance story to The New York Times on Saturday, June 28 — two
days before sending its
letter to Congress on Monday, June 30, informing lawmakers.
“Obama to Seek Funds to Stem Border Crossings and Speed Deportations,” read the Times headline.
The
supplemental request had been anticipated for a month. The real news
was the second half: the request for new authority to speed
deportations.
The
decision to go public June 28 followed morning phone calls that same
Saturday in which the White House consulted about a dozen top Democratic
players in Congress and
felt encouraged to go forward. But the haste with which the
administration then rushed to leak its plans for the Sunday papers —
without first having draft legislation in place — quickly aggravated an
already dicey political situation.
In
the ensuing debate, the absence of any clear White House alternative
left all the writing to Republicans, who seized the chance to press for
far greater changes than
Obama envisioned.
It
was not until July 11 — two weeks later — that the administration had
its first group meeting with Democratic committee staffers whose job
would be to write such legislation.
The White House’s stated goal was to honor the human rights claims of
the children while establishing more of a deterrent to their coming by
dramatically cutting the time for deportation proceedings. But the
administration came with no drafts in hand to show
how it proposed to achieve this balance.
Adding
to the confusion, really two bills were in play. The president’s June
30 letter — which first spoke of his wanting additional authority from
Congress — was only
a preamble to a second, July 8 letter spelling out Obama’s request for
$3.73 billion in emergency funding to cope with the crisis.
By
then the administration — in response to Senate Appropriations
Committee Chairwoman Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.) — was separating the two
issues: money to deal with immediate
needs and changes in law going forward.
The
White House now insists this was always its intention. But nothing in
the Times advance story June 28 suggested a two-track approach. And
Obama himself was still melding
the two as late as July 9 after meeting with Texas Gov. Rick Perry on
the border crisis.
Speaking
of his talks with Perry, Obama said the governor had expressed “concern
that right now kids who come to the border from Mexico are immediately
deported, but because
it’s noncontiguous, folks who are coming from Central America have to
go through a much lengthier process.”
“I
indicated to him that part of what we’re looking [for] in the
supplemental is some flexibility,” the president said, “in terms of
being able to preserve the due process
rights of individuals who come in, but also to make sure that we’re
sending a strong signal that they can’t simply show up at the border and
automatically assume that they’re going to be absorbed.”
Belatedly,
the White House did reach out, and, in fairness, some of the criticism
leveled by Democrats in Congress is self-serving.
Obama
met with the Congressional Hispanic Caucus on July 16. Following the
July 11 staff meeting, there was a second session between White House
and top congressional
staffers on July 18 to explore what compromises were possible. But the
situation had deteriorated to the point where neither side seemed to
trust the other.
Democrats
complained of being manipulated by an administration too cute to put
its name behind a bill. The White House, which had hoped to “partner”
with Democrats, came
away feeling it was damned if it did, damned if it didn’t.
Publicly,
lawmakers might complain of seeing nothing in writing, officials said.
But privately, staff said their bosses would be furious if the White
House were to submit
legislation at this stage.
Feinstein
— who was seen by the administration as someone who might have provided
some opening — was more the exception. But even that exchange was
sensitive for other
Democrats, and Feinstein soon clammed up on the matter.
Repeated
requests by POLITICO to speak to the senator were rejected. Written
questions were submitted in advance and went unanswered. The California
Democrat, as chairwoman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was said to be too focused on
other matters. Instead her press office referred a reporter to the
senator’s floor speech July 30 — a speech that said nothing about the
fax.
What
Feinstein did talk about was her role in writing the 2008 law at issue
now: the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act.
Adopted
with broad support at the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, the law
built on earlier efforts in 2002 to have unaccompanied child migrants
separated from adults
quickly and turned over to the Department of Health and Human Services.
The 2008 statute took this a big step further by adding protections for
those who travel greater distances from Asia, for example, or, in this
case, Central America — countries not contiguous
to the U.S. border.
“The
numbers are so great and so unprecedented that our federal agencies
understandably are having difficulty carrying out the procedures and
timelines in place,” Feinstein
said of the child migrants and the 2008 law. But she was mum about
meeting with Johnson on how to legislate changes in those procedures.
The White House fax sent to her office was never mentioned.
Senate
Democrats, with whom Feinstein shared the White House draft, were no
more open. “Very sorry, but we can’t help you on this one,” was the
answer that came back from
even the talkative Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.).
For
all this silence, speculation abounds that the president will resort to
executive orders to get what he wants. But there are still serious
doubts in the administration
that Obama has that authority in the case of the child migrants. And
however dysfunctional Congress has become, can a president turn to
executive orders when he never submitted a bill?
For
the moment, the flow of children at the southwest border has now
subsided in the summer heat. Congress is gone for August. Wars in Iraq,
Gaza and Ukraine and racial
unrest in Missouri command more attention.
After
failing to act, the administration and lawmakers have patched over
their differences enough to get through September without the emergency
funds requested by the
president.
But
the issue will come back to the fore next month when lawmakers take up a
stop-gap continuing resolution, or CR, needed to keep the government
operating past the November
elections.
To
save money — and appease Republicans — HHS has already begun to pull
children out of more costly temporary shelters at military bases. At the
same time, the House and
Senate Appropriations committees have signed off on Johnson shifting
about $405 million within his department to meet the immediate needs of
border patrol and immigration agencies.
The
biggest remaining sore point is the Republican refusal to allow just $4
million requested by Attorney General Eric Holder to help provide some
legal counsel for the
children, when called before the immigration courts for deportation
proceedings.
Many
are under 14 and unable to speak English — “It’s Dickensian,” said one
Democratic aide. The standoff echoes Obama’s own failure to ever submit
the changes in law
that he wanted.
Like
all immigration law, two values compete in this crisis. First is the
sovereign right of the U.S. to control its borders. Second is America’s
broader commitment to
human rights, represented here by the children themselves.
Indeed,
the U.S. has a long history of Pan-Americanism in its approach to
immigration policy, and it was only in the 1960s that Congress began
imposing numerical national-origin
quotas on Western Hemisphere countries. Critics would argue that those
quotas were set so low that they inevitably created “illegal aliens” — a
label that next fed into a political fear of chaos at the border, a
chaos that makes it harder to see the human
side of what the child migrants are in this case.
Professor
Mae Ngai is a historian at Columbia University whose book “Impossible
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America” is relevant
here.
Ngai
focuses on the period from post-World War I to the 1960s and the
historical origins of the “illegal alien” label in American law and
politics after the U.S. began
imposing a system of national-origins quotas.
Discrimination
was not new. But the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 was the first
comprehensive set of restrictions, establishing numerical limits and its
own global racial and
national hierarchy. Countries of Southern and Eastern Europe received
smaller allotments to exclude Italians, Slavs and Jews. Chinese and
Japanese were barred entirely.
The
Hart-Cellar Act — reflecting the civil rights movement of the 1960s —
sought to end this discrimination and instituted a policy based more on
individual qualifications,
with preferences for professionals and relatives of immigrants who had
already established themselves in the U.S. But it was a far cry from the
vision first espoused by its chief Senate sponsor, Sen. Phil Hart
(D-Mich.). And in the final bargaining, Sens.
Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) and Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) insisted that the
quotas be extended to nations in the Western Hemisphere.
“Restrictions
beget illegality, and then people focus on illegality,” Ngai said, and
she plainly wishes that policymakers would look back more to the vision
put forward
by Hart.
“The
Hart bill was a combination of American needs and other countries’
needs, which is something we never think about anymore,” she said. “We
think of immigration as
something we decide unilaterally in the nation’s interest, in America’s
interest. Hart had a much different view. He had a view that
immigration should be thought of kind of a global phenomenon … and other
countries’ needs and interests should be a factor.
… Hart was trying to get to something beyond a unilateral system.”
When
the CR debate comes in September, there will again be the opportunity
for compromise on how to deal with the child migrants. But many believe
the well is so poisoned
at this stage that any deal before November’s elections seems
impossible.
The challenge is best captured by two voices — Republican and Democratic — from this summer’s debate.
One
belongs to Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R-Neb.), who embraced the hard line
taken by the House GOP but also comes from a conservative religious
background that has allied
him in the past with refugee and relief efforts sympathetic to the
children.
“The
United States cannot have a just and vibrant and good immigration
policy when there is chaos and disorder at the border,” he told a
Nebraska radio station with some
frustration. “It undermines our ability to be generous.”
The other is Rep. José Serrano (D-N.Y.), one of the most senior Hispanic lawmakers in the House.
“At
the end of the day, the question may not be: Who are the children at
the border, and why are they here? The question may be: Who are we as a
nation, and why are we
here as a Congress?” Serrano told his colleagues.
“We
have to understand that these are children,” Serrano said. “These are
our children. Just because a border separates us, this doesn’t stop them
from being our children.”
For more information, go to: www.beverlyhillsimmigrationlaw.com
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