The Hill (Congress Blog)
By David Leopold
August 12, 2014
With
the House GOP’s refusal to take up immigration reform legislation, the
debate has shifted to the extent to which President Obama can act on his
own to make the immigration
law work better until Congress provides a permanent solution.
Among
the administrative actions rumored to be under consideration is the
expansion of DACA—the deportation deferral Obama gave to qualified undocumented youth in 2012.
The administration is reportedly considering expanding it to the
undocumented parents of U.S. citizen children and perhaps others.
Critics
have questioned the president’s authority to do so. A broad,
categorical deferral of deportation, they contend, grossly exceeds the
President’s executive authority
amounting to “amnesty by fiat.” The Washington Post Editorial Board
went so far as to warn that Congressional dysfunction “does not grant
the president license to tear up the Constitution.” New York Times
columnist Ross Douthat characterized it as an “extraordinary,
reckless and (yes) ceasarist” abuse of executive authority, “worthy of
outcry and opposition.”
Those are some pretty serious claims. Fortunately, they are not even close to correct.
Even
Obama’s most ardent critics must concede that his constitutional duty
to faithfully execute the immigration law gives him wide latitude in its
enforcement. What’s
less clear are the limits of that authority. How far can the president
go?
The
reason this is not an easy call is because the line between exercising
discretion over enforcement and crossing over to policy making is often
blurred. One thing that
exemplifies this is determining when a case-by-case grant of discretion
crosses over to a categorical grant. Critics like to argue that
case-by-case exercises of discretion are acceptable but categorical are
not.
But
it does not follow that this crosses that line. As long as the
administrative decision to defer the removal of a group of undocumented
immigrants is legitimately
aimed at more efficient use of law enforcement resources, it arguably
falls well within the president’s discretion. This includes the
discretion to defer the deportation of undocumented
immigrants—individually or as a group—if doing so allows the
administration
to focus resources on keeping the country safe.
In
fact, presidents of both parties have used categorical grants of
deferred action to postpone the deportation of large groups of
undocumented immigrants, including abused
women, hurricane victims and refugees.
Therefore,
to violate the constitution, the president’s action must be a dramatic,
extraordinary departure from universally accepted exercises of
executive discretion.
DACA or its expansion don’t even come close.
In
2011, two years before DACA was announced, former ICE Director John
Morton authorized enforcement agents to exempt a broad group of
undocumented immigrants from immediate
removal based on several factors—including length of time in the U.S.,
family ties, education, health, criminal history. The Morton Memo, which
was the culmination of more than a decade of agency enforcement
guidance, drew criticism from immigration hardliners
as lax enforcement and from advocates for not going far enough. But no
one seriously challenged the administration’s authority to issue it.
DACA,
which was announced a year later, took the Morton memo a step further
by applying deferred action—a specific form of prosecutorial
discretion—to a distinct category
of undocumented youth. It made them eligible for a temporary two year
deportation reprieve and employment authorization. This, according to
critics, crossed the constitutional line because unlike the Morton Memo,
DACA contained all the trappings of law making,
including a public announcement, employment authorization and a
bureaucratic process.
That
may be a useful political argument. And there is no question that DACA
looks and feels different than undocumented status—it permits
undocumented youth to step into
the sunlight of their communities, work legally, complete school and
obtain a driver’s license. But legally neither DACA (or is expansion)
nor the Morton Memo, offer undocumented immigrants any vested right
under existing law. They provide no new lawful
immigration status and beneficiaries remain vulnerable to removal. Like
any grant of administrative grace DACA can be revoked by the government
with the stroke of a pen, at any time, and for any reason.
Legally
therefore, DACA is not much different than executive discretion
contemplated by the Morton Memo, which even conservatives concede was
well within the president’s
authority to issue. Like the Morton Memo DACA or its expansion is
nothing more than a temporary postponement of deportation for
undocumented immigrants whose removal is a low enforcement priority.
This temporary reprieve from removal falls far short of amnesty
which, presumably, would offer qualified undocumented immigrants a new
set of rights and obligations, including lawful immigration status and a
pathway to citizenship coupled with due process rights, including the
right to defend against denial or revocation.
Critics
like to say that the availability of employment authorization or the
use of forms and fees pushes the DACA process or its expansion over the
blurry line from lawful
discretion to executive lawlessness. But they conveniently forget (or
are not aware) that the president’s authority to authorize employment of
immigrants is long-standing and already well-established in the law.
The regulation that grants work authorization
to immigrants granted deferred action predates DACA and applies to many
other categories of people granted deferred action, such as abused
women, hurricane victims, and refugees. The president’s authority to
grant work status long precedes DACA, and while
it does apply to DACA and would apply to its expansion, it is not an
outgrowth of either.
Nor
do use of forms and fees and a bureaucratic process evidence executive
law making. Putting aside that the government uses forms and fees for a
variety of discretionary
benefits—including stays of removal (Form I-246), protection under the
Violence Against Women Act (Form I-360), Parole (Form-I-131)—the
establishment of a bureaucratic process merely promotes agency
efficiency and uniform adjudication.
Those
who challenge Obama’s authority to act on his own to limit deportations
fail to make the case that DACA or its expansion is such a dramatic
departure from the Morton
Memo (or other universally accepted forms of prosecutorial discretion)
that it constitutes the naked power grab they claim. It’s not enough
that it looks different, it must be different; significantly different
from what is accepted as lawful discretion.
But it isn’t significantly different.
In other words, it’s legal.
Leopold is an Ohio-based attorney and the former president of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA).
For more information, go to: www.beverlyhillsimmigrationlaw.com
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