New York Times (Upshot)
By Nate Cohn
April 13, 2015
Marco
Rubio, who announced his bid for the presidency on Monday in a call to
donors, has been called the “best communicator” in the Republican Party.
Over and over and
over again.
But he has little to show for it.
He
enters the fray with surprisingly low support. Despite four years of
national prominence, he has averaged 6 percent of the vote in primary
polls over the last few months.
That’s the same or worse than five candidates who are thought to have a
much smaller chance of winning the nomination: Ted Cruz, Rand Paul, Ben
Carson, Mike Huckabee and Chris Christie. Mr. Rubio is acceptable to
many but, so far, the first choice of few.
Mr.
Rubio’s struggle to break through is a powerful reminder that winning a
presidential primary is not just about skill as a politician. It’s
about positioning, and Mr.
Rubio, at the moment, is in a much worse position than many assessments
of his political talent would suggest. In basketball terms, he’s boxed
out.
Mr.
Rubio is competing for many of the same donors and operatives as Mr.
Bush. Both not only come from the same state but also from similar
ideological wings of the party.
Despite the initial insurgent bid against Charlie Crist that made him a
Tea Party hero, Mr. Rubio has always been an establishment-oriented
candidate. The reporting about Mr. Rubio’s time in Washington suggests
that he has followed an elite-driven path, following
all the rules, seeking the guidance of the conservative intelligentsia,
and trying to lead the party toward a compromise on immigration reform —
the preferred means of the establishment-business wing of the party to
expand the party’s general election appeal.
Mr.
Bush’s pre-emptive bid to build elite support has denied Mr. Rubio the
opportunity to consolidate the center-right wing of the party. Perhaps
this wouldn’t be a big
problem if Mr. Rubio were a favorite of the conservatives skeptical of
Mr. Bush’s candidacy, but the field is full of candidates who are
equally good or better fits for many conservative voters.
Scott
Walker, who took on unions and won in Wisconsin, is a conservative
hero. Ted Cruz is a favorite of the Tea Party. Mike Huckabee is a
favorite of evangelical Christians.
Then there is a long list of other conservative candidates — like Ben
Carson, Rick Santorum, Rick Perry and Bobby Jindal — who might compete
for votes.
Mr.
Rubio’s failed effort at immigration overhaul exemplifies the
challenges he faces. He held 20 percent of the vote in primary polls at
the beginning of 2013, but his
standing collapsed along with immigration and has never recovered. His
ill-fated effort may not be on the minds of most voters today, but he
lost the support of many on the right. And in later renouncing his own
reform effort, he lost credibility with much
of the center-right. In the end, he was on the side of no one.
Exceptional
candidates could overcome a tough starting position. They could carve a
niche for themselves — voters from disparate factions would be drawn to
their compelling
message, while elites would recognize their potential appeal and even
like them personally.
But
the Republican Party is a deeply factionalized place, and that makes it
much harder for a broadly appealing candidate to emerge. Mr. Rubio is
not the obvious leader
of any major faction of the party, and his message isn’t obviously
oriented toward any wing of the party, either.
The
challenge for Mr. Rubio is heightened by the first two nominating
contests, Iowa and New Hampshire, which are better understood as
factional winnowing contests. The
Iowa caucuses are deeply conservative — 47 percent of caucus-goers in
2012 identified as “very conservative” — and even more evangelical: 57
percent identified as born again or evangelical Christians. New
Hampshire, on the other hand, is among the most moderate
contests in the country: 47 percent of New Hampshire primary voters
were self-identified moderates four years ago. It is not surprising that
a candidate with broad but shallow appeal, like Mr. Rubio, has
struggled to gain a strong foothold in either state.
The
easiest path for Mr. Rubio will be if Mr. Bush proves less formidable
than early reports suggest. In this situation, a large number of party
elites would grow skeptical
of Mr. Bush’s chances in the general election, or question whether he
could win the primary. They would find Mr. Walker ill-prepared or
unelectable, and decide that Mr. Rubio was the best option. He would
compete hard in Iowa but ultimately hope for a win
in New Hampshire, where many of the party’s conservative candidates
will struggle.
If
Mr. Bush doesn’t falter, Mr. Rubio will need to muscle his way to
victory. It’s a tougher path than if Mr. Bush did not run, but not
impossible. And if you believe
that Mr. Rubio is a great candidate, a great communicator and a
youthful contrast to Mr. Bush, then perhaps it’s even likely.
However,
Mr. Rubio has yet to prove himself an exceptional candidate. In today’s
digital era, one would expect truly exceptional candidates to
distinguish themselves fast.
Mr. Obama, after all, already held 25 percent support according to
polls by this time eight years ago. Mr. Rubio’s 6 percent pales in
comparison, and it’s less than the amount held by all but one of the 13
candidates who have won their party’s nomination since
1980. The one exception, Bill Clinton, faced a weak field in a
late-developing race.
Mr.
Rubio is not a stealth candidate. He is well known and has had ample
opportunities to earn the trust of Republican voters. He might be in
third place in his own home
state. At a certain point, one wonders whether he is like the
first-round draft pick who doesn’t make the All-Star team after four
years. His form might look perfect, but, for whatever reason, he just
doesn’t perform the way many thought he might. Fans can
be forgiven for continuing to hold out hope that he might break out. No
one would be stunned if he ultimately did so, but maybe it’s no longer
the likeliest outcome.
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