January 2, 2020 / The New York Times
I have tried to write at least one column every year about Guantánamo in the belief that what happened there, and what the Supreme Court had to say about it, still matters — even though only a few dozen prisoners remain from the hundreds once held there as legal proceedings grind on with no end in sight.
Having missed my goal in 2019, I’m starting the new year with a Guantánamo column. It’s not about Guantánamo per se, but rather about a new Supreme Court case that will test the current justices’ adherence to an important constitutional principle that emerged from the struggle among the three branches of government over what legal regime should govern the detention of those deemed enemy combatants in the aftermath of 9/11.
In a series of rulings from 2004 through 2008 that were notable for majority coalitions of justices appointed by both Democratic and Republican presidents, the court rejected the claims of both the White House and Congress that the federal courts had no business in Guantánamo. The most important of these decisions was the final one, Boumediene v. Bush. Congress had tried in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over cases brought by Guantánamo detainees. The court ruled, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, that the detainees had a constitutional right to seek habeas corpus, the ancient English remedy for illegal detention.
The case now before the court, to be argued in early March, is in essential respects Boumediene’s direct descendant. The question in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam is whether a 1996 federal immigration law unconstitutionally stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction over cases, including habeas corpus cases, brought by undocumented immigrants who are subject to what the law designated as “expedited removal.”
The immigrant in this case, Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, is a member of the minority Tamil population in Sri Lanka who applied for asylum after being apprehended crossing the Mexican border into California. Expedited removal applies to, among others, those aliens who are deemed inadmissible upon arrival; an immigration officer can order their immediate deportation. The rules are different if the immigrant is seeking asylum. Those individuals appear before an asylum officer to be screened for the required “credible fear of persecution or torture” if sent back to their home countries.
If “credible fear” is found, immigrants enter what is known as a “full removal proceeding” where they can apply for asylum and obtain judicial review if asylum is denied. But an immigrant who fails the initial screening, as Mr. Thuraissigiam did, receives only a truncated administrative review process and remains in expedited removal. The only access to federal court is for a claim of mistaken identity. The law, which carries the unwieldy name of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, provides: “There shall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal.”
In its decision last March, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the law unconstitutional. “Boumediene is our starting point,” the appeals court wrote. It held that like the Military Commissions Act that the Supreme Court invalidated in that case, the immigration law amounted to an unconstitutional “suspension” of habeas corpus. The reference is to Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, the Suspension Clause, which provides: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”
In the government’s petition to the Supreme Court, which the justices granted in October, Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that Boumediene was “fundamentally different” from this case, because while the Guantánamo detainees were seeking release from custody so they could return home, Mr. Thuraissigiam is already free to return home but is trying to stay: “He would be removed to and released in Sri Lanka forthwith absent his habeas petition.”
Whatever its merits, this was a conventional legal argument. Lawyers are always distinguishing their case from the case that set the precedent, aiming to persuade a court that the precedent shouldn’t apply because the facts or context are different.
Then something changed.
The brief on the merits that Solicitor General Francisco filed in December took a surprisingly different line of attack on the Ninth Circuit’s decision. In addition to distinguishing Boumediene as inapplicable, the brief argues that Mr. Thuraissigiam’s claim must fail because the Constitution’s framers would not have applied the Suspension Clause to immigrants seeking relief from deportation. This is an aggressive “originalist” argument that comes very close to telling the court that Boumediene itself was wrongly decided. “This court has stated that ‘the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789,’ ” the brief asserts, citing an immigration case from 2001, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr. It continues: “And in 1789, the writ did not protect the sort of claim that respondent asserts here.”
To be generous, that is at best a partial rendering of what Justice John Paul Stevens said in his majority opinion in the St. Cyr case. Here is the relevant paragraph, highlighting two important words that the administration’s brief left out (Enrico St. Cyr was a Haitian immigrant trying to avoid deportation; he won the case):
“In sum, even assuming that the Suspension Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, there is substantial evidence to support the proposition that pure questions of law like the one raised by the respondent in this case could have been answered in 1789 by a common law judge with power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if we were to accept the I.N.S.’s submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise.”
Justice Kennedy voted with the St. Cyr majority. And in his majority opinion seven years later in Boumediene, he had this to say: “The court has been careful not to foreclose the possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have expanded along with post-1789 developments that define the present scope of the writ.”
What accounts for the administration’s aggressive advocacy in the face of the carefully nuanced precedents that apply to this area of the law? Two factors, I think. The first is that conservatives despise the Boumediene opinion. Judge Raymond Randolph, a stalwart conservative on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, who wrote the opinion that the Supreme Court overturned in Boumediene, has openly been at war with the Supreme Court over Guantánamo.
In a 2010 speech to the Heritage Foundation, he compared the justices in the Boumediene majority to Tom and Daisy Buchanan in “The Great Gatsby:” “careless people, who smashed things up” and who “let other people clean up the mess they made.” And another conservative judge on the same court, Laurence Silberman, in a concurring opinion in 2011 called Boumediene “the Supreme Court’s defiant — if only theoretical — assertion of judicial supremacy.”
After Boumediene, dozens of Guantánamo detainees brought habeas corpus petitions in Federal District Court in Washington, and the judges of that court granted relief to many of them. But the conservative judges on the appeals court overturned one favorable ruling after another in what at least from the outside looked like a systematic effort to “clean up the mess” by rendering a potentially powerful rights-protecting decision toothless. Not once did the appeals court uphold a detainee’s grant of habeas corpus. Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who was a judge on the D.C. Circuit throughout that period, joined the majority in two of the more important cases.
The war on Boumediene is not ancient history. In his widely noticed speech to the Federalist Society in November, Attorney General William P. Barr took direct aim at the decision, referring to it as the climax of “the most blatant and consequential usurpation of executive power in our history.” According to the attorney general, the Supreme Court, in its series of Guantánamo cases, “set itself up as the ultimate arbiter and superintendent of military decisions inherent in prosecuting a military conflict — decisions that lie at the very core of the president’s discretion as commander in chief.”
An attorney general doesn’t ordinarily get involved in the day-in, day-out work of the solicitor general’s office. I’m willing to speculate that Mr. Barr was at most only vaguely aware of the Thuraissigiam case until the court agreed to hear it. I’m guessing that at that point, he saw his opening — an opportunity to shackle the right of habeas corpus to a theory of originalism, as rigid as it is ahistorical, and to perhaps inspire some justices to take a fresh look back at Boumediene.
That brings me to the second factor that explains the turn the administration is taking. Both the St. Cyr and Boumediene cases were decided by votes of 5 to 4. (Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Boumediene was memorable. “It will almost certainly cause Americans to die,” he predicted.) Justice Kennedy was in the majority in both. Now, of course, Justice Kavanaugh sits in Justice Kennedy’s seat.
In renewing my commitment to write about Guantánamo every year, I’m not limiting myself to once a year. This case has been overshadowed by pending Supreme Court cases on issues more central to the public conversation. But in their time, it was the Guantánamo cases that held the country in thrall. The current attorney general’s position notwithstanding, that series of decisions represents the best the Supreme Court has to offer the country, an assertion of principle beyond politics. The Trump administration’s advocacy having put that legacy on the line, the question now is whether it will be shredded like so much else in this troubled time.
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